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analysis. In particular, we show how a common practice of doing policy analysis with 
vector error-correction models fails. As an example, we apply these concepts to discover 
fundamental flaws in a resent strand of literature estimating the carbon Kuznetz curve, 
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that the relationship is eventually reversed. Due to a causal misspecification, the 
compatibility between climate and development policy goals is overstated. 
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To specify a model with causality is one of the most fundamental tasks of
econometric policy analysis. Yet it seems that relatively little eﬀort is put into
developing analytical tools to help assess causality in econometric models and
to gain insights on the a priori implications of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
The probabilistic language commonly used in econometrics does not provide
a rigorous deﬁnition of causality. Therefore it is often exhaustingly diﬃcult
to debate about causes and eﬀects in complex models with many equations,
variables, and statistical assumptions.
Scientiﬁc discourse on causality requires a rigorous framework that al-
lows to describe systematically, to break down, and to assess the meaning of
various statements regarding causality between variables. Such causal frame-
works allow to express well-deﬁned causal statements that have well-deﬁned
truth values.
Diﬀerent frameworks for handling causality have been developed (Hoover,
2008). The potential-outcome framework developed by Neyman (1935), Ru-
bin (1974, 1978), and Holland (1986) is mostly used within statistics (Pearl,
2009; Heckman, 2005) and the program evaluation literature (Angrist and
Krueger, 1999; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). It deﬁnes causality by an
analogy with random experiments. Cowles Commission econometricians
(Haavelmo, 1943, 1944; Marschak, 1950; Simon, 1953) deﬁned causality with
respect to structural equations models. The elaborate graph-theoretic frame-
work by Judea Pearl (2009), which has received much attention recently, is
partly based on the deﬁnition of causality by the Cowles group. The “econo-
metric approach” for deﬁning causality by Heckman (2005, 2008, 2010), and
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007), which also builds on the Cowles Commission
econometrics, has one crucial advantage over Pearl (2009) and the potential-
outcome framework: it allows for simultaneous determination of variables
(nonrecursive models and cyclic graphs) which is a property often needed
in econometrics. The potential-outcome framework and Cowles Commission
econometrics are considered to be special cases of Pearl’s framework (Pearl,
2009) and the econometric approach (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007). Note
that these interpretations of causality have little to do with predictive rela-
tionship coined as Granger causality (e.g. Granger, 1969).
A main shortcoming of potential-outcome framework and the econometric
approach is their inability to express multi-level causal orderings between
variables and represent them as graphs, as done by the Cowles group and
1Pearl (2009). Causal ordering implied by a econometric model can be critical
for the interpretation of the model. Visualizing causal relationships using
graphs is not merely a way to illustrate a model, but also a tool for rigorous
deduction.
Pearl’s framework has received some criticism by econometricians (Leroy,
2001; Neuberg, 2003; Hoover, 2003; Heckman, 2005; Heckman and Vytlacil,
2007; Heckman, 2008), with some resolved (Pearl, 2003; Pearl, 2009, p. 374–
380) and some left open. Its remaining weakness is the need to attach an
unique dependent variable to each equation to deﬁne causality, which is sel-
dom justiﬁed by economic theory.1
To get the best parts of both the econometric approach and Pearl’s frame-
work, we build on a theory by Herbert Simon (1953) to establish a language
to describe causal relationships and extract them from econometric models.
We deﬁne a causal framework that ﬁxes the aforementioned weaknesses in
previous frameworks.
Our framework allows us to deﬁne and detect causal misspeciﬁcation
problems in econometric models. That is, it enables us to discover incon-
sistencies within a wide range of models that are used for policy analysis.
With these tools we can tackle problems in more complex models where they
have been left unnoticed. We use the tools to show how policy analysis with
vector error-correction models (VECM) (Engle and Granger, 1987) gives in-
consistent and biased results under common practices (see e.g. Lütkepohl,
2005; Watson, 1994; Hamilton, 1994; Johansen, 1995). The problem is re-
lated to the asymmetry of the cointegration rank tests.
To apply the tools into practice, we analyze a resent strand of literature
estimating the carbon Kuznetz curve (CKC), which postulates an “inverted
U”-shape relation between carbon dioxide emissions and aggregate output of
economies. That is, emissions are assumed to initially grow with output, but
the relation is reversed when the economy reaches a higher level of output. In
this paper we discuss the problems related to the new strand of literature by
focusing on the seminal work by Ang (2007). We argue, ﬁrst, that the model
includes an implicit constraint that is neglected in the estimation. Second,
the causal eﬀects are misinterpreted due to variable deﬁnitions. Third, the
1For example, with a market equilibrium one would have to argue that one equation
(demand) determines the price and another equation (supply) determines the quantity.
On the contrary, most economists would consider that price and quantity are determined
simultaneously by demand and supply.
2model is biased to overstate the compatibility of development and environ-
mental policy goals. In a more realistic model emissions rise quicker, peak
later, and decrease slower as output increases.
It is our intention to strictly limit to the task of analyzing model speciﬁ-
cations and their consistency.2 We do not discuss identiﬁcation, estimation,
or testing, except to point out immediate implications regarding them, and
to show the relevance of the theoretical considerations. Forgetting this dis-
tinction is a source of much confusion (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007; Pearl,
2009).
In the next section we present a framework for expressing causality. In
the third section we introduce the new CKC literature, discuss Ang’s (2007)
model, and derive an accounting identity that causes one of the problems. In
the fourth section we describe the aforementioned three problems and apply
the causal framework. In the ﬁfth section we conclude.
2. Causal framework
Next we develop a framework for analyzing causality. We present the
parts of the causal framework that are needed to show how common practice
policy analysis with VECMs fails and to present the misspeciﬁcation prob-
lems in the new CKC literature. We build on the graph-theoretic, causal
Bayesian network literature pioneered by Pearl (2009), but we take seriously
the criticism made by econometricians (Leroy, 2001; Neuberg, 2003; Hoover,
2003; Heckman, 2005; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007; Heckman, 2008) and
adapt ideas suggested by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007). To deﬁne causality,
we utilize and generalize the theory by Simon (1953) (which is also aug-
mented by Simon and Rescher (1966); Simon and Iwasaki (1988); Druzdzel
and Simon (1993)).
We deﬁne a causal framework that overcomes weaknesses in Pearl’s causal
model and Heckman’s “econometric approach”, in order to enhance its suit-
ability for econometric analysis. The main beneﬁt is that we can analyze
causality with graphs in models with simultaneously determined variables,
such as the vector autocorrelation (VAR) model. Next we give a descriptive
account of the distinctive features of our framework before giving a rigorous
deﬁnition.
2 This is distinguished as the task of “deﬁning counterfactuals” in Heckman (2005,
2008, 2010), and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007).
3First, in order to analyze causality as deﬁned in the Bayesian network
literature, Pearl’s (2009) framework is limited to models with acyclic re-
lationships, or recursive systems, which means there are no cycles of cau-
sation. For such models, deﬁning causal interpretations for parameters is
less debated (Strotz and Wold, 1960, 1963; Basmann, 1963b,a). However,
most econometric models are nonrecursive, i.e. some variables are deter-
mined simultaneously by a set of equations, and there can be causal cycles.
When variables are simultaneously determined, Pearl’s causal model can not
be used. Pearl’s limitation to recursive systems has been the main point
of criticism by econometricians (Leroy, 2001; Hoover, 2003; Neuberg, 2003;
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007).
We, however, are interested in the necessary causal relationships implied
by a econometric model, as we are looking for inconsistencies in model spec-
iﬁcations. Therefore we leave open the question of causality between simul-
taneously determined variables and focus on what can be agreed upon. This
allows us to extend the framework to nonrecursive models.
Second, nonrecursiveness of models implies that variables enter model
equations symmetrically. This means we circumvent the so called matching
problem, i.e. the need to identify one variable for each equation and consider
that variable as the output (or the dependent variable) of the equation.3
Such matching has been a major obstacle for using Pearl’s framework in
econometrics, since economic theory usually does not justify that there is a
speciﬁc dependent variable for each equation of the model.4
Our way of avoiding the matching problem, however, makes it impossible
to use Pearl’s deﬁnitions for interventions and counterfactuals. In Pearl’s
framework interventions and counterfactuals are deﬁned by “surgery” and
“shutting down” equations (Pearl, 2009, p. 374). Anyhow, such model
manipulations have received criticism from econometricians (Neuberg, 2003;
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007).
Third, in our framework interventions and counterfactuals are deﬁned
with variables that are determined outside the models (see Pearl, 1993, 2009,
p. 70–72). The points of interventions are modelled explicitly and separately
by deﬁning a set of possible actions. We consider models as isolations and
3Instead, we partition the sets of equations (derived substructures, deﬁned later) and
variables (which are solved in the derived substructures), and match between these subsets
(see Dash and Druzdzel, 2008).
4For example, this is the case with market equilibria.
4idealizations of the world (Mäki, 2011, 2008) and regard the economist as a
deistic demiurge of the model world: ﬁrst the economist deﬁnes the model
that represents reality, next he chooses an action (a policy or a treatment)
outside of the model, and then lets the model resolve itself generating an out-
come. Consequently we manage without Pearl’s do-operator and “surgery”.
We note that to choose nothing is also an action, and hence interventions can
be deﬁned equivalently using conditional probabilities or ﬁxing (Pearl 2009,
p. 70–72, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007).
The action variables are strictly separated from other variables. Hence,
the demiurge can never ﬁx the same variables that describe the unit of ob-
servation. For example, the price determined by the market is never quite
the same variable as the price determined by the government. However, if
justiﬁed, the model can be speciﬁed such that ﬁxing an action to a particular
value (government-set price) has the same result as if other variables (market
price) realize with the same value. This strict separation of action variables
and other variables is pivotal for deﬁning interventions without model ma-
nipulations like the “surgery”.
The econometric approach ends up doing surgery in a very implicit way,
as argued by Pearl (2009, p. 374–380). One simply can not ﬁx endogenous
variables (to assess causal eﬀects) when their value is uniquely determined
by the set of model equations: If one changes the value of the outcome
to something other than the solution, it results in a contradiction with the
set of equations. By deﬁnition there is only one outcome that satisﬁes the
set of equations. This somewhat trivial notion is often neglected in the
literature. To assess the causal eﬀect between endogenous variables, one
needs to explicitly formulate and justify a new, consistent causal model,
which isolates and idealizes reality in a way that the causing variable is an
action variable.5 In our framework “surgery” can be expressed by specifying
the points of intervention and action variables accordingly. That is, equations
can be shut down with action variables if so speciﬁed. Moreover, we never
end up contradicting with the initial model. The resulting framework is a
slight generalization of Pearl (2009, p. 71).
Fourth, assuming symmetry between variables makes extracting a causal
ordering slightly more complicated compared to acyclic models. We develop
further the theory introduced by Simon (1953), known as the causal ordering
5A similar notion is made by Strotz and Wold (1960).
5algorithm, which deﬁnes a systematic way to express the asymmetric relation-
ships between variables in a set of equations, relationships that correspond
to the conventional meaning of causality.6 That is, a set of equations related
to a econometric model contains in its formulation a description of causal
relationships, and Simon’s theory allows us to explicate this causal content.
We generalize Simon’s (1953) theory into a non-linear and nonparametric
form, we simplify it by adopting a new conceptualization, and proof that the
causal ordering is unique.
Fifth, the main weakness of the econometric approach is its limitation
to a simple dichotomic interpretation of causal ordering: variables are either
eﬀects or causes. Using causal graphs we can form a more complex picture
where variables can be both causes of some variables and eﬀects of others.
Such a mesh of relationships can be easily depicted by a directed graph.
This also obviates the need to diﬀerentiate between ex ante and ex post, or
objective and subjective outcomes as done by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007);
Heckman (2010).7
Our concept of “action variable” is similar to ”treatment“ in Heckman
and Vytlacil (2007), except that a treatment can depend on other variables
(for example in ”causal models for the choice of treatment“). In our frame-
work such a model would be expressed by considering the treatment as an
endogenous variable.
Sixth, because we only consider model speciﬁcations and set aside the
other tasks of statistical inference, we can avoid a bountiful source of con-
fusion by considering models simply as well-deﬁned mathematical objects.
Hence problems with policy invariance (as deﬁned e.g. by Leamer, 1985;
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007), autonomy (as deﬁned e.g. by Haavelmo, 1944;
Aldrich, 1989; Pearl, 2009), and endogeneity (as deﬁned e.g. by Wooldridge,
2002, p. 50–51) are not attributes of a single model, but are deﬁned as a
relationships between two models. When considering bias, we need to spec-
6Note that in this framework causality is deﬁned in reference to a particular model
speciﬁcation, and does not necessitate causality in the real world nor include all forms of
causality in theory: First, the framework itself is not subject to Hume’s critique, problems
of observing causality, or any ontological problems (Simon, 1953). Second, determination
of variables by deﬁnition is also deﬁned as causal. Third, causal relationships between
simultaneously determined variables are not determined. Here causality is simply a concept
that proofs very useful in analyzing problems with model speciﬁcations.
7We do not explicate ex ante and ex post outcomes as they simply are special cases.
6ify the “true” and the “biased” model.8 A model is called “biased”, if there
exists a better justiﬁed model, the “true” model, in which a given parameter
of interest (e.g. the causal eﬀect) has a diﬀerent value. While postulating
the “true” model, one also conﬁrms that the oﬀered speciﬁcation is without
contradictions.
Moreover individual models are always policy invariant and autonomous.
That is, the parameters of a model do not vary because they are ﬁxed by
deﬁnition. If one wants to consider variation in these values, one needs
to specify a model where they are deﬁned as variables. Similarly models
(as such) never suﬀer from endogeneity problems because all dependences
between variables are to be speciﬁed by the model. This does not, however,
imply that we only analyze “structural” models (in any sense of the word
surveyed by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007)).
Furthermore, a causal parameter of interest might be infeasible in the
“true” model, i.e. the parameter can not be deﬁned in the “true” model
without contradictions, even if it is well-deﬁned in the “biased” model.9 In
such cases the “biased” model does not just give distorted estimates, but the
very existence of such an estimate is in logical conﬂict with the “true” model.
This problem is far more severe than a simple case of poor approximation.
A weakness of our framework is that it is designed only for analyzing
model speciﬁcations, so it makes no accommodations for identiﬁcation, esti-
mating, or testing. However it is clear that these tasks fundamentally depend
on the soundness of the model speciﬁcation.
We proceed as follows: ﬁrst, we deﬁne a causal model which states the
necessary speciﬁcations to consider causality in an econometric model, sec-
ond, we show how to derive causal ordering between variables in a causal
model, third, we show how to depict the causal ordering as a causal graph,
fourth, we give an example, ﬁfth we deﬁne causal eﬀects and causal misspec-
iﬁcation bias, and ﬁnally we consider the case of VECMs.
8The idea is similar to the distinction between small and middle-size worlds by Simon
and Iwasaki (1988). See also Mäki (2011).
9For example, suppose that the causal eﬀect is calculated between variables x and y in
the “biased” model. If x and y are both endogenous in the “true” model, then their value
is determined by the model and can not be changed by the demiurge. Hence the causal
eﬀect can not be deﬁned.
72.1. Causal model
Let us consider a statistical model that consists of a set of random vari-
ables W and a set of probability distributions P satisfying model equations
gi(w1,...,wn) = 0, i = 1,...,m, (1)
where gi’s are real-valued functions; wj ∈ W for all j = 1,...,n; and n ≥ m.
Suppose we can partition the set W of a statistical model into disjoint
subsets Y , X and U, where Y has m members. This could be called a
econometric model (see e.g. Matzkin, 2007). Variables Y are observed and
determined inside the model, and named endogenous; variables X are ob-
served and determined outside the model, and are usually named exogenous;
and variables U are unobserved and determined outside the model (as in
Leamer, 1985). Here, we do not diﬀerentiate between unobserved and ex-
ogenous variables, because they have identical roles when identiﬁcation is
not considered (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007), hence we include unobserved
variables in set X.10
The set of equations (1) can depict a structural model, a quasi-structural
model, a VAR model, or something completely diﬀerent. We consider these
equations purely mathematical entities where the equality relation is symmet-
ric. We do not implicitly diﬀerentiate between left and right hand variables.
This results in a desired ambiguity between structural and non-structural
models.
Note, that some variables entering functions gi can be trivial, i.e. not
all functions depend on all variables. This independence, as seen later, is
actually essential for causality.
To consider the corresponding causal model, we ﬁrst specify the points
of intervention for the model. Interventions are done through a set of action
variables A, which speciﬁes the ways the demiurge aﬀects the model (actually
or hypothetically). We deﬁne vector a∗ as a particular value of A which
represents the action of making no intervention. We express the points of
intervention with deep model functions fi, which correspond to model (1)
when a = a∗, i.e.
fi(w,a
∗) = gi(w)
10Pearl (2009) partitions the variables into endogenous variables and background vari-
ables, which are similar to exogenous and unobserved variables, but are used in a slightly
diﬀerent role due to a diﬀerent deﬁnition of model equations.
8is satisﬁed for all w = (w1,...,wn) and i.11 As a special case, we say inter-
ventions are additive if fi(w,a) = fi(y,x,a) = gi(y,x + a), where y ∈ Rm,
x,a ∈ Rn−m, and a∗ = 0. Under additive interventions, actions can be
interpreted as changing the values of exogenous variables.
Next we deﬁne our fundamental concepts:
Deﬁnition 1. A set of equations S is a structure if it satisﬁes the regularity
conditions:
1. S is uniquely solvable,
2. S contains an equal amount of equations and variables, and each sub-
set of S contains at most as many equations as non-trivial, unsolved
variables, and
3. S’s subsets are uniquely solvable if and only if they have an equal
amount of equations and non-trivial, unsolved variables.
Let X and A denote the sets of possible values for the sets of variables
X and A, respectively.
Deﬁnition 2. A causal model is a 5-tuple M = (Y,X,A,F,P), where Y , X,
and A are sets of variables, F is a set of real-valued functions {f1,...,fm},
and P is a set of probability functions for variables X, if for all p ∈ P,
x0 ∈ X, and a0 ∈ A the set of equations
fi(y,x,a) = 0, i = 1,...,m (2a)
x = x0, (2b)
a = a0, (2c)
is a structure when x0 is in the support of p.
Compared to the plain statistical model, a causal model separates be-
tween endogenous and exogenous variables, and speciﬁes how interventions
are done via action variables. Later we will see, that this provides the re-
quired information to give meaning to causal statements.
The exogeneity equations (2b) and (2c) supplement the model equations
(2a) to state which variables are determined outside of the model. This is
11 Similar deﬁnitions are given by Heckman (2005) when naming the set of actions as
possible treatments and functions fi as “deep structural” versions of gi, and by (Pearl,
2009, p. 70–72) when deﬁning interventions as variables.
9required for an unequivocal causal ordering (Simon and Iwasaki, 1988) as
shown later. Model equations (2a) and exogeneity equations (2b) and (2c)
can be referred to as mechanisms. We emphasize that mechanisms do not
necessarily relate to real world phenomena. Here a mechanism is just a name
for equations of certain form.
Let vector v(x,a) ∈ Rn denote the solution (or the outcome) of structure
(2) for given exogenous variables x ∈ X and action variables a ∈ A in
causal model M. We deﬁne interventions and counterfactuals in deterministic
terms:
Deﬁnition 3. Given that x occurred, changing action from a to a0 has the
eﬀect of changing the outcome from v(x,a) to v(x,a0).
Deﬁnition 4. Given that a was chosen and x occurred, the counterfactual
statement “the outcome would have been v0 if action a0 6= a would have been
taken“ is equivalent to saying v0 = v(x,a0).
Counterfactual statements between arbitrary subsets of variables, i.e.
“outcome of variables V1 ⊂ Y ∪X ∪A would have been v1, if V2 ⊂ Y ∪X ∪A
had been v2 (given x)” are not well deﬁned.12 To make such a statements,
one has to add, how outcome v2 was achieved, i.e. deﬁne which action would
v2 as an outcome. In other words, one must specify the action a for which
outcome v(x,a) is consistent with v2. Therefore the truth value of such sen-
tences depends on how the counterfactual condition was reached. If no action
results in outcome v2, such a sentence has no meaning in the given causal
model.
We give an example to show how the concepts can be used. Consider a
simple model equation g(y,x,u) = y−βx−u = 0, with endogenous variable
Y = {y}, exogenous variables X = {x,u}, and parameter β. Assuming
additive interventions, we get a deep model function f(y,x,u,a) = y−β(x+
a) − u. Now we get a causal model with a structure consisting of equation
y − β(x + a) − u = 0, x = x0, u = u0, and a = a0,
when (x0,u0) occurs and a0 is chosen. The resulting outcome of the model
is a vector v(x0,u0,a0) = (β(x0 + a0) + u0,x0,u0,a0).
12Similarly Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) discuss causal eﬀects between endogenous vari-
ables.
102.2. Causal ordering
The causal ordering of a causal model can be determined by studying the
structure (2). The concept of structure is a convenient way to check whether
suﬃcient and non-contradiction information is given to consider causation
in an econometric model. The key innovation of Simon (1953) is that the
order of solving the structure determines the causal ordering in the model.
Roughly speaking, a variable is caused by all the variables that need to be
solved to determine its value. Next we develop concepts to formalize this.
Deﬁnition 5. A subset of a structure is a substructure if it is solvable and
does not contain any proper subsets that are solvable.
The following lemma states a property of substructures, that is important
for showing that the causal ordering in a structure is unique.
Lemma 1. Substructures of a structure are disjoint.
The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Let S be a structure and s the variables it contains. We can decompose S
into two disjoint parts: First, we have S0 which is the union of all substruc-
tures, e.g. S0 = S1 ∪S2 ∪···∪Sk, where Si is a substructure of structure S.
Second, we have the remainder R = S\S0.
Deﬁnition 6. Structure S is causally ordered if R is nonempty.
Deﬁnition 7. Let structure S = S0∪R be causally ordered and let s0 be the
set of variables in S0. Now we can solve equations S0 to get unique values
for variables in s0. By substituting the solved variables into set R we get the
derived structure of ﬁrst order S1.
In less formal terms, the derived structure equals set R where solved
variables s0 have been plugged in.
Under the ﬁrst regularity condition, a derived structure must also be a
structure. If it also is of causally ordered, its derived structure is called a
derived structure of second order (of the structure S). By repeating, we can
obtain the derived structure of kth order.
We proceed in this manner until the derived structure is not causally
ordered, i.e. the remainder R is empty.
Deﬁnition 8. Let Sk be the derived structure of kth order structure S. The
substructures of Sk are called the derived substructures of kth order.
11The substructures of the original structure are called the derived sub-
structures of 0th order, and their union S0 is called the derived structure of
0th order.
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where Sk is the derived structures of kth order, Sk
1,Sk
2,...,Sk
mk are the de-
rived substructures of kth order, mk is the number of derived substructures
of kth order, and n is the highest order of derived structures. More consisely
we can write S = ∪l
k=0 ∪mk
i=1 Sk
i ∪ Sl+1 = ∪n
k=0 ∪mk
i=1 Sk
i for any 0 < l < n − 1.
Lemma 2. The partition is unique.
The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Similarly the set of variables s in structure S has been partitioned accord-
ing to the derived substructures in which they are solved. Due to regularity
condition 3, each derived substructure with m equations must solve m vari-
ables.
As variables are uniquely related to the derived substructures, we can use
the ordering to deﬁne key concepts related to variables.
Deﬁnition 9. Let variables x and y appear non-trivially in a derived sub-
structure of kth order of structure S. Let dx and dy be the lowest order of
derived substructure where variables x and y appear non-trivially, respec-
tively. Then in structure S,
• if dx = dy, variables x and y are simultaneously determined, and
• if dx < dy = k, we say x is a direct cause of y.
We denote a direct causal relationship with the symbol “→”. Note that,
the direct cause relationship is not yet transitive. Therefore we deﬁne the
following:
Deﬁnition 10. Let s be the set of variables in a structure. Variable x ∈ s
is a cause of variable y ∈ s if there is a sequence of variables z1,...,zn ∈ s,
for which x → z1, z1 → z2, ... , and zn → y.
12We deﬁne causal ordering of a structure as the set of all direct causal
relationships between variables. With these deﬁnitions, as a corollary of
Lemma 2, we get our main result:
Proposition 1. The causal ordering of a structure is unique.
This guarantees that the properties of the causal ordering relate to the
structure unambiguously.
2.3. Causal graphs
Next we deﬁne a causal graph, which describes the causal ordering and
which we can present visually.13 A causal graph consists of a set of nodes,
which is the set of variables a in structure A, and a set of edges, which is
the set of all variable pairs (x,y) for which x → y. Together these form a
directed graph, where arrows represent direct causes. The graph is drawn
such that the 0th order variables are in a column on the left, the 1th order
variables are in the second column, and so on. To simplify graphs, we depict
simultaneously determined variables by a left bracket, and unite all arrows
leading to variables in these brackets (see Simon and Rescher, 1966).14
Now from Proposition 1 it immediately follows that a graph is a suﬃcient
representation of the causal ordering of the structure:
Proposition 2. The causal graph of a structure is unique.
13This is speciﬁed as a partial causal graphs in Dash and Druzdzel (2008).
14 In practice a causal graph of structure A can be drawn by following a simple procedure:
(1) Make sure A satisﬁes the regularity conditions. (2) Find the substructures of A, i.e.
all subsets that are solvable but themselves do not contain solvable subsets. (3) Solve
the substructures. Set the solved variables in a column. If a substructure contains more
than one variable, join the simultaneously determined variables by drawing a parenthesis.
(4) If there are unsolved equations, plug the previously solved values in to the remaining
equations. (5) Find the substructures of the set of remaining equation and solve them.
Set the variables in the next column and join simultaneously determined variables by a
parenthesis. (6) For each solved substructure draw an arrow from all variables that are
included in the substructure but solved earlier. (7) Repeat steps 4–6 until all equations
are solved.
132.4. Example
Lets look at an example to illustrate the framework. Let
f1(v1,v3,v5) = 0 (3a)
f2(v2,v3,v4) = 0 (3b)
f3(v3,v4,v5) = 0 (3c)
f4(v3,v4,v6) = 0 (3d)
v5 = a (3e)
v6 = b (3f)
be a structure, where a and b are given. First, we see that equations (3e)
and (3f) are substructures and form the derived substructures of 0th order.
Therefore the structure is causally ordered. Variables v5 and v6, which could
be exogenous or action variables, can be solved and substituted in the other
equations. Next, while v5 and v6 are now given, equations (3c) and (3d) can
be solved simultaneously, but not separately. This means {(6b),(6c)} is the
only derived substructure of 1th order. Therefore values for v3 and v4 are
simultaneously determined. Finally, we are left with equations (3a) and (3b).
They both form a derived substructures of 2th order. Solving them gives the
value for v1 and v2.






In graph (4) we see, for example, that v6 is a cause of v1 and a direct
cause of v4. The variables v5 and v6 are exogenous in the structure, and
variables v1, v2, v3, and v4 are endogenous in the structure.
2.5. Causal eﬀects and misspeciﬁcation bias
Causal misspeciﬁcation is a relationship between two causal models, one
of which we call the “true” and other the “biased” model. We deﬁne two
types of causal misspeciﬁcation: infeasibility and bias. Infeasibility occurs
if the causal eﬀect of a variable is analyzed in the “biased” model when the
variable is endogenous in the “true” model. In other words, the variable is
determined by the equations of the “true” model, so intervening with the
14variable in the “biased” model contradicts the “true” model (see an example
below). Bias occurs when the magnitude of causal eﬀect is diﬀerent in the
“true” and “biased” models.
To be more speciﬁc, we deﬁne the individual level deterministic causal
eﬀect of a change in an action for a causal model with continuous variables
and diﬀerentiable model functions. The causal eﬀect (CE) of action a ∈ A
on v ∈ Y ∪ X ∪ A of a causal model is the total derivative dv
da. It can
be calculated from the structure of the causal model by using the implicit
function theorem (or taking the total derivatives and applying the Cramer’s
rule) (see Appendix B).
With additive interventions, an action a enters the functions similarly
to it’s corresponding exogenous variable x ∈ X. Therefore the derivative is
same for both the action and exogenous variable. That is, for any variable
v ∈ Y applies dv
dx = dv
da. This means we can analyze a model as if the
exogenous variables could be aﬀected directly, which simpliﬁes the causal
model signiﬁcantly. (An example will be given in Appendix F.)
For the rest of the paper we specify all models with additive interventions.
Therefore we can analyze models as if the demiurge chooses the exogenous
variables directly and omit the action variables from the structures and the
causal graphs.
Let M1 = (Y1,X1,A1,F1,P1) be a “true” causal model with continuous
variables and diﬀerentiable model functions with additive interventions.15
Now consider a similar “biased” causal model M2 = (Y2,X2,A2,F2,P2) such
that there exists variables x ∈ X1,X2 and y ∈ Y1,Y2. Suppose CE1 and CE2
are the causal eﬀect of x on y in models M1 and M2, respectively. Then the
causal misspeciﬁcation bias of the causal eﬀect is CE2 − CE1.
For example, such a bias emerges when the causal graph of the biased
model does not include all causal paths from the eﬀect x to the cause y.
This occurs when the “biased” model incorrectly assumes a variable, z, as
exogenous when it actually is endogenous such that x is a cause of z and z
is a cause of y. These missing paths, i.e. chains of arrows from x through z
to y, are easy to detect from the causal graphs, as is with case of VECM.
15The “true” model parallels to the “all causes” model in Heckman and Vytlacil (2007).
152.6. Causal misspeciﬁcation bias in VECM






























































parameters for all i = 1,2,3 and j = 1,2. (See for example Hamilton, 1994,
p. 580–582.) We call this model B.
Now consider a related model A, where equation (8) is substituted with
z2
t = 0. This corresponds to omitting the second cointegration equation from
the model.
Finally, consider model C, which is similar to model B in equations (5)–
(8) but includes a third cointegration equation. Hence, equations (5) are
supplemented with a third error error-correction term z3
t.
We can summarize the three models by noting that they are all VECMs
where the cointegration rank of model A, B, and C are 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively. That is, the models have a diﬀerent number of cointegration equations
included in them.
A common practice of doing policy analysis with VECMs is to consider
a part of the model, called the long-run model (see e.g. Engle et al., 1989),
which consists of equations (7)–(8) in the case of model B, i.e. the cointegra-
tion equations. When considering the long-run model, the error-correction
terms, zi
t, are considered as exogenous error terms. Policy assessment is made
by considering counterfactual statements with respect to these equations and
evaluating causal eﬀects between the variables.
To make such policy analysis, one must ﬁrst decide which cointegration
equations to include in the model speciﬁcation, i.e. one needs to specify the
cointegration rank (or choose on of models A, B, and C). Diﬀerent sets of
cointegration equation give diﬀerent values for causal eﬀects.
16The problem with the common practice is in the statistical test procedure
(see e.g. Watson, 1994; Hamilton, 1994; Lütkepohl, 2005) based on Johansen
(1988, 1995), to specify the cointegration rank. More speciﬁcally, the problem
is with the tests for cointegration rank that are used to determine which
cointegration equations (7)–(8) to include in the model. In the procedure,
ﬁrst, we justify the existence of one cointegration equation by testing the null
hypothesis of no cointegration equations against the null hypothesis of one
or more cointegration equations. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we infer
that there must be at least one cointegration equation, in which case, we
continue by testing the null hypothesis of one cointegration equation against
the hypothesis of two or more cointegration equations. We continue in this
way until the null hypothesis can not be rejected. Then policy evaluation is
done with a model where all thus inferred cointegration equations are added.
The test is more cautious not to make a false positive, i.e not to specify
the model with cointegration equations that are not in the “true” model.
Correspondingly, the test makes a false negative more often, i.e. fails to
reject the null hypothesis when it is false. A false negative occurs especially
often when the power of the cointegration rank test is poor, like when the
sample size is small and deterministic trends are possible (Demetrescu et al.,
2009). This unevenness accumulates so that the test procedure tends to
result in a model with a too low cointegration rank.
However when considering causal eﬀects, causal misspeciﬁcation bias oc-
curs symmetrically with a false positive and a false negative. That is, it is
equally harmful to have too many or too few cointegration equations in the
model. Hence the uneven test procedure is not well-founded.
We show this symmetry by considering models A, B, and C. First, let
us consider the case of a false negative. Suppose that model B is the “true”
model, i.e. the true cointegration rank is 2. Suppose that in the test proce-
dure the ﬁrst null hypothesis is rejected, but the second is not. Now we infer
that equation (7) holds, but equation (8) might or might not hold, and drop
it out of the model. This false negative results in model A, which is “biased”.
Let CEA and CEB be causal eﬀects (for example between y1 and y2) in
models A and B, respectively. Now if we use CEA, instead of the true causal
eﬀect CEB, we end up with causal misspeciﬁcation bias CEA−CEB because
of the false negative.
Second, consider the case of a false positive. Suppose that model A is the
“true” model, i.e. the true cointegration rank is 1. Suppose we make a false
positive in the second stage of the test procedure. That is, we infer that the
17cointegration rank is 2, add equation (8), and end up with model B, which is
“biased”. In this case the causal misspeciﬁcation bias is CEB − CEA, which
is equal and opposite to the previous case.
Furthermore, in addition to bias, there is the problem of infeasibility of
causal eﬀects. To see this, consider that the “true” model is model C, which
has three cointegration equations. Because there are only three endogenous
variables, the three cointegration equations give a unique solution for the
variables. Because the values are determined by the equations, we can not
intervene with them without creating a contradiction. Hence, the causal
eﬀects between the variables can not be calculated, i.e. they are infeasible.
If we make a false negative in this case and leave out cointegration equations,
the analysis of causal eﬀects is in logical contradiction with the “true” model.
To conclude, because of the uneven treatment of false positive and nega-
tive, the common practice fails to deliver unbiased estimates of causal eﬀects.
Moreover, a failure to detect a full cointegration rank leads to a logically in-
consistent causal analysis.
In section 4 we show how bias emerges with the CKC literature, because
of a missing equation.
3. Carbon Kutznets curve
3.1. The new approach
We apply the causal framework to analyze a recent strand of literature
in environmental economics dealing with the long-standing debate on the
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), which has received novel attention as
concerns for climate change and the need for global mitigation action have
gained more awareness. The EKC depicts a relationship between emissions
and output: at low levels of economic development growth increases emis-
sions, but at higher levels of output the relationship is reversed. Graphically
this implies an “inverted U” shape for the function of output to emissions
(see Figure 1). When the focus is particularly on carbon dioxide emissions,
the relationship is referred to as the carbon Kuznets curve (CKC).
The CKC-hypothesis has substantial relevance to development and cli-
mate change mitigation policies. Under the CKC-hypothesis, economic growth
would ultimately contribute to the reduction of emissions, implying synergy
between development and mitigation policy goals. Typically the alternative
is to assume that emissions grow as output grows. This would imply a conﬂict































































Figure 1: Relationship between the logarithm of per capita CO2 emissions per capita and
the logarithm of per capita GDP in France, 1960-2006.
between development and mitigation goals, and a need for separate climate
policies.
Over the last few decades the EKC-hypothesis has generated an enormous
amount of literature. The recent strand of literature has attempted to merge
the CKC literature (emissions-output-nexus) with a related topic concerning
the relationship between energy consumption and output (energy-output-
nexus)(See Figure 2).16
16In a precursory study, Richmond and Kaufmann (2006) attempt to estimate the tip-
ping point of the CKC with various model speciﬁcations. Some of these model spec-
iﬁcations use the consumption shares of diﬀerent fuel types to explain carbon dioxide
emissions levels. The seminal work by Ang (2007) examines the relationship between
emissions, energy consumption, and output in France using cointegration methods and a
vector error-correction model (VECM). Total energy consumption is included as an ex-
planatory variable to tackle omitted variable bias. Apergis and Payne (2009, 2010) extend






















































Figure 2: Relationship between the logarithm of total energy consumption per capita and
the logarithm of per capita GDP in France, 1960-2006.
We describe three problems concerning the foundations of this new strand
of literature. First, the nonlinearity of the CKC model is not compatible
with vector autoregression (VAR) models, because it creates a binding yet
neglected constraint for the model, which compromises the integrity of the
and apply this method for panel data on South American countries and for the countries
of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Pao and Tsai (2010) applies this to panel
data on BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and later (2011) add foreign
direct investment as a regressor. Soytas et al. (2007) use emissions, energy consumption,
and output among others variables in a vector autoregression model (VAR) for the United
States. Soytas and Sari (2009) apply a similar method for Turkey. Halicioglu (2009)
adds foreign trade and uses an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) model for
Turkey. Jalil and Mahmud (2009) use an ARDL model for data on China and add foreign
trade as an additional explanatory variable, while Jalil and Feridun (2011) add ﬁnancial
development to the equation.
20estimators. The second and third problems relate to the inclusion of energy
consumption as a explanatory variable.17 The second problem arises because
emissions are not measured directly in the datasets that are used by the
referred articles. Carbon dioxide emissions are deﬁned by a linear function of
diﬀerent fuel commodities. As a result, controlling for the level of energy use
means that only carbon intensity of energy is allowed to vary. Subsequently
the interpretations of the parameters are very diﬀerent. The third problem
is caused by the dependence between energy use and output. When this
dependence is recognized, we see that the model is biased.
In this paper we discuss the problems related to the new strand of litera-
ture by focusing on the seminal work by Ang (2007). Some of the articles of
the strand use slightly diﬀerent methods and models so the problems mani-
fest in diﬀerent ways.18 But they all have the common feature of controlling
for energy in a CKC model. As we restrict our analysis to the article by Ang
(2007), we can only cast serious doubt on the validity of the other papers
and motivate a need for a re-evaluation. It is then the task of another paper
to assess their viability.
3.2. Ang’s model
Next we present the model introduced by Ang (2007). The CKC-hypoth-
esis is examined using cointegration and vector error-correction modelling
techniques (see e.g. Engle and Granger, 1987; Engle et al., 1989) applied to
data on France between 1960 and 2000. The time series on emissions, energy
use, and output are assumed to include stochastic trends, therefore many
traditional time series methods are not applicable.
A long-run relationship between the time series can exist if stochastic
trends are common to variables. A common stochastic trend implies that
that there is a linear combination of the time series such that the combination
is stationary. In which case, the time series are said to be cointegrated.
17The articles in question only brieﬂy comment the rationale for doing this. Some argue
that it helps to tackle omitted variable bias, but, how it would solve the endogeneity
problem, is left without any justiﬁcation or discussion. Nevertheless, this is not a trivial
matter, and is the source of the second and third problem.
18For example, Apergis and Payne (2009, 2010) use a very similar methodology to
Ang’s. But Richmond and Kaufmann (2006) could face very diﬀerent complications as
they explain emissions with fuel proportions, not total energy use. Soytas et al. (2007)
and Soytas and Sari (2009) use a time series technique known as the Toda-Yamamoto
procedure, which does not explicate a long-run model, as do vector error-correction models.
21Such a relationship is speciﬁed by Ang (2007) as a long-run (or steady-
state) model
ct = β0 + β1et + β2yt + β3y
2
t + ut, (9)
where ct is carbon dioxide emissions, et is total energy use, yt is real GDP
measured in local currency, all measured in per capita terms and converted
into natural logarithms, and ut is a stationary error term.19
As in a typical CKC-model, the square of output is included to capture
the nonlinearity in the CKC. The CKC-hypothesis implies that parameter
β2 is positive and β3 is negative to form an upside-down parabola. The novel
feature is the included regressor et.
In addition to the long-run model, Ang (2007) studies the dynamic causal
relationship between the time series by specifying a VAR model and the
corresponding error-correction representation that incorporates equation (9).
The VAR model describes how the variables vary, in the short-run, around
the long-run model.
If Ang’s (2007) long-run model is to be used for policy analysis, the
model must be interpreted causally. That is, to answer the central question
of the CKC-literature (how does output aﬀect emissions), we must be able
to answer counterfactuals statements (if output was increased, how would
emissions behave). In other words, we need a causal model.20
To consider the policy question of the CKC-hypothesis, the long-run
model can be represented as a causal model with additive interventions. Its
structure consists of equation (9) and of equations determining the value
of the exogenous variables et, yt, and ut. Carbon emissions ct is chosen as
endogenous in order to answer policy relevant questions regarding the CKC-
hypothesis.21 In this simple case, it seems that the carbon emissions ct is the
19The long-run and short-run models are actually components of the same VECM. The
error term of the long-run model corresponds to the error-correction term of the VECM.
(Engle et al., 1989.)
20Note that, even though Ang obviously refers with “causality” to Granger causality,
the model must be appended with traditional causality if it is to have any policy relevance.
21Note that the estimation process of the VECM does not imply any particular causal
ordering between the variables. This choice is made only for argument’s sake: emissions
must be determined inside the model if we are to assess eﬀects on them.





In Section 4 we show that this causal ordering is not the full story.
To sum up, Ang’s model is policy relevant and attempts to address the
CKC-hypothesis only if it is understood as a causal model where emissions
are the eﬀect of output. We claim that, if the model is interpreted in this
manner, it can not answer the CKC-hypothesis. Note that we make no
claims about causality in the real world. We are only interested about the
consistency of causal statements with respect Ang’s model.
The following section will introduce the tools needed to present the prob-
lems in Section 4.
3.3. The data and deﬁnitions
To consider the CKC literature, it is important to take into account how
the carbon dioxide emissions data is produced in the datasets that are used
in the literature.22 Essentially, there are no actual measurements of carbon
dioxide emissions. They are simply calculated from energy statistics (see
Appendix C).
We deﬁne an important concept: Carbon intensity At is the average emis-
sions rate of energy consumption.23 Carbon intensity measures how much
22Ang (2007), Apergis and Payne (2009, 2010), Soytas et al. (2007), Soytas and Sari
(2009), and Jalil and Mahmud (2009) use data from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI) dataset, which in turn uses carbon dioxide emission data calculated by
the U.S. Department of Energy’s Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC)
(Boden et al., 2009). In the CDIAC dataset carbon dioxide emissions are calculated from
consumed quantities of diﬀerent fuel commodities and cement manufacturing. The CDIAC
dataset uses energy statistics by the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) among
others. UNSD data is used for the time period analyzed in this paper. The WDI dataset
uses energy statistics compiled by the International Energy Agency (IEA). Richmond and
Kaufmann (2006) use data compiled by the IEA on energy use, and calculates the carbon
dioxide emissions by multiplying fuel use by the appropriate carbon content factor.
23Note that here carbon intensity refers to the ratio of carbon emissions to energy
consumption. This is not to be confused with carbon intensity of output which is the ratio
of carbon emissions to output.
23carbon dioxide emissions one unit of energy produces on average. Appendix
C gives a formal deﬁnition.
Given the calculation form for carbon in the dataset and the concept of
carbon intensity, we can derive identity
Ct ≡ EtAt + Xt, (11)
where Ct is carbon dioxide emissions, Et is total energy consumption, and
Xt is emissions from gas ﬂaring and cement manufacturing, all measured per
capita. Appendix C shows how this identity is derived.
It is important to note, that this is simply an accounting identity derived
from the deﬁnitions of the dataset, so it must be satisﬁed in the sample.
That is, identity (11) holds by deﬁnition in the dataset.
To derive an algebraically more convenient form, we note that gas ﬂaring
and cement manufacturing amount only to a percent of total carbon emissions
in the data, thus they can be omitted, i.e. set to zero. Therefore taking a
natural logarithm of equation (11) gives
ct = et + at, (12)
where the variables are the corresponding logarithms of the capital letter
variables.
Next we present the three problems in the new CKC literature and apply
the causal framework.
4. The misspeciﬁcations in the new CKC literature
4.1. Transformations in a VAR model
The ﬁrst problem arises because of the simple functional relationship
between the observed variables yt and y2
t. Inspired by Haavelmo (1943), we
notice that the system of equations implies a restriction between the joint
distributions, which should have been taken into account in the estimation
of the parameters. More speciﬁcally, the assumption of normally distributed
i.i.d error terms (Johansen, 1988) is in contradiction with the VAR model
equations.
To show this, lets look at the VAR model presented by Ang (2007):
xt = a0 +
p X
i=1
Aixt−i + εt, (13)
24where xt = (ct,et,yt,y2
t) is a vector of logarithms of observed variables, εt ∈
R4 is a vector of error terms for time t = 0,...,T, a0 ∈ R4 is a vector of
constants, Ai ∈ R4×4 is a matrix of parameters for lag i, and p is the number
of lags.
To simplify the analysis, we restrict to a model only two variables, yt and
y2
t, and assume that p = 1, a0 = 0, and Ai = [ajk] ∈ R2×2. Hence our model
consists of equations












Now plugging yt of equation (14) into equation (15) and rearranging gives
ε
2





2 − a21yt−1 − a22y
2
t−1. (16)
First,we notice that equation (16) constrains a polynomial relationship be-
tween error terms ε1
t and ε2
t, hence they can not both be normally distributed,
when the lagged variables are given at time t.
Second, we can show that the error terms are not independent over time.
To see this, ﬁrst note that equation (14) implies that
∂yt−1
∂ε1
t−1 = 1. Now using

















which is generally non-zero. Hence the value of error term ε2
t depends on
ε1
t−1, and therefore they can not be chosen independently.
This means that the assumption of normally distributed i.i.d error terms,
which is required by Johansen’s (1988) estimation method, can not be sat-
isﬁed and the estimates are not reliable. We also see a much more general
property: including a transformation of an endogenous variable into a VAR
model as an endogenous variable creates an implicit constraint between error
terms.
Alternatively, the problem can be seen easily by using the causal frame-
work. First note that this VAR model speciﬁcation does not constitute a
structure if we assume that all error terms are exogenous. This is because,
for each time period t, we have two model equations but only one endogenous
variable, as y2
t is a simple transformation of yt. That is, given that the error
terms are exogenous, there are two model and two exogeneity equations for
25each t but only three variables, yt, ε1
t, and ε2
t. This means that the regularity
conditions are not satisﬁed and the equations do not form a structure, which
implies that the model speciﬁcation is inconsistent.
Instead, if we assume that one error term is endogenous, we get a con-









2 . . .
Here we clearly see, that error term ε1
1 is a cause of ε2
1 and ε2
2, which reveals
the problematic dependency between the error terms. This is an example
how the causal framework helps in detecting contradictions in the model
setup.
Because there are other problems of misspeciﬁcation in Ang’s model, on
which we want to focus, we assume in the subsequent sections that the afore-
mentioned problem is only minor and does not change the estimates signiﬁ-
cantly.
4.2. The interpretation of the parameters
Now we turn to the second problem. Wrong interpretation of the pa-
rameters and resulting wrong conclusions arise from the deﬁnition of carbon
emissions in the dataset (Section 3.3). It is worth emphasizing, that this
problem is not about the ﬁtness of the model, but is related to the speciﬁca-
tion of the model. We take Ang’s model as given in order to deduce what it
actually implies.
The long-run model equation (9) represents the policy relevant part of
Ang’s model. In relation to this equation causal and counterfactual state-
ments are made (such as: if energy use would be higher, then emissions
would be higher). Therefore it is fair to interpret the model equation (9) as
a part of a causal model as described in Section 2. In Appendix D.2 we show
that the problem described in this section also emerges when considering the
short-run model, i.e. the VAR model.
26In the context of CKC, the parameter of interest is the causal eﬀect of
output on carbon emissions. That is, we want to know how output eﬀects
emissions. In model equation (9), the proposed interpretation of the partial
causal eﬀect of yt on ct,
∂ct
∂yt
= β2 + 2β3yt, (17)
would be that it quantiﬁes the causal relationship between emissions and
output.24 This would be the Marshallian ceteris paribus change that assumes
other variables constant (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007).
This however, does not take into account the conceptual dependence be-
tween energy and carbon emissions that is captured by identity (11). Recog-
nizing this dependence reveals that the causal eﬀect (17) has a much more
narrow interpretation than implied.
Before applying the causal framework, we give, in more conventional
means, three arguments for the existence of a problem, to show the necessity
of a rigorous framework:
First, since the partial derivative (17) requires that total energy use et
is held constant, we notice from identity (11) that, in this case, the level
of carbon dioxide emissions Ct can only change through changes in carbon
intensity At, or gas ﬂaring and cement manufacturing emissions Xt. As the
signiﬁcance of Xt is negligible and assumed zero, like in equation (12), a
change in output results in a change in carbon intensity at. The causal ef-
fect (17) can be interpreted only as the causal eﬀect of output yt on emissions
ct through carbon intensity at. This ignores the eﬀect of yt on ct through en-
ergy use et. As a result, the model is actually a regression analysis of carbon
intensity, instead of carbon emissions.
Second, the problem can be also seen by comparing the causal eﬀect (17)
and the derivative of identity (11). To simplify, assume gas ﬂaring and ce-
ment manufacturing emissions are constants. Now partially derivating iden-










If emissions level et is held constant, as is required to calculate the causal
eﬀect (17), the second term on the right hand side of (18) is omitted. This
24To be exact, we are interested in the expected conditional partial derivative, but to
ease notation, we do most of the analysis as if it was a deterministic model.
27means that the causal eﬀect (17), which Ang (2007) investigates, is only the
ﬁrst term in (18).
Third, a more explicit regression equation can be formulated. When
the negligible eﬀects of gas ﬂaring and cement manufacturing are assumed
to be zero, equation (12) can be plugged into equation (9) to eliminate ct.
Rearranging gives equation
at = β0 + (β1 − 1)et + β2yt + β3y
2
t + ut. (19)
Here we see that model equation (9) is equivalently an regression on carbon
intensity at, and the functional form between at and output yt is exactly the
same as between carbon emissions ct and yt.
It easy to oppose this kind of reasoning with deceptively convincing coun-
terarguments, by presenting diﬀerent counterfactuals and relationships. To
make a rigorous account of our argument and possible counterarguments, we
use Simon’s theory.
First, we assume gas ﬂaring and cement manufacturing emissions are zero
for convenience. Second, we form a set of model equations
ct = β0 + β1et + β2yt + β3y
2
t + ut, (20)
ct = et + at, (21)
where the ﬁrst equation is (9), which is assumed to hold for arguments sake,
and the second equation is (12), which result from identity (11) and the
previous assumption. Third, we select the equations determining the value
of the exogenous variables. This can be understood as ﬁxing the inputs (see
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007). As exogenous we select variables et because
it is deﬁned as a control variable, yt because it is represents our action, and
ut because it represents the other factors whose eﬀect we want to omit as a
ceteris paribus assumption. We represent these by equations
et = e
0
t, yt = y
0






t are given values. We can think that the values are picked
by some external mechanism, e.g. nature or the government.
Together equations (20)–(22) form a structure for which we can draw a
graph. Solving the set of equations reveals the causal relationships between





Regarding the whole structure, carbon intensity at is the ultimate endogenous
variable. In other words, if a change in output yt causes a change in emissions
ct, this means that carbon intensity at must have changed. This is not sound
with the theory of the carbon Kutznets curve because lower carbon intensity
should be a cause of lower emissions, not the other way around.
Next show how the framework can be used to tackle some intuitive coun-
terarguments. What if we claim that et is not exogenous and leave equation
et = e0
t out? This would not be a structure any more and variables et, ct,
and at would not be determined. What if then choose ct to be exogenous in-
stead of et? Then we would get a diﬀerent causal ordering and a new graph,
but this would not be relevant for inspecting the CKC hypothesis as we are
interested in the eﬀect of yt on ct.25
What if we claim that there is an additional relationship between the
variables? This means adding a new equation to the structure. This can give
us a diﬀerent causal ordering and a new graph. First, if the new equation
contains a new variable, the eﬀect is similar to adding equation (12) to model
equation (9), as done above. Graph (10) corresponds to model equation (9)
alone, but adding equation (12) gives us graph (23). Second, if the new
equation does not contain a new variable, we have to make one variable
endogenous. This is what we propose in the next section.
As we argued that Ang’s model is explaining carbon intensity instead
of carbon emissions, one might wonder why the model ﬁts so well. We ad-
dress this question in Appendix E and argue the ﬁt is misleading due to the
polynomial shape of the model.
4.3. Bias
The third problem is a misspeciﬁcation bias rising because energy use et
is dependent on output yt. To begin, let’s look at the data. First, note that
25Also this is technically restricted because the binomial in (9) has two roots.
29Figure 2 depicts levels of energy use over diﬀerent output levels. It seems like
there is a relationship between the variables: energy use is larger when output
is larger. This suggest that producing more output requires more energy, as is
apparent from theory. Second, note that, as identity (11) implies, variations
in both carbon intensity and energy use are essential for the CKC. This can
be seen from Figure 3. Here the development of carbon emissions in France
(curve A) has been decomposed in to a growing energy consumption (B)
and a declining carbon intensity(C).26 This shows that, without the growth
of energy consumption, emissions in 2006 would be 60% less compared to
1960. On the other hand, without the shift to cleaner fuels, emissions would
be 150% higher in 2006. This means that clearly both factors need to be
accounted for.


































Figure 3: Curve A is the index of carbon emissions, B is a index energy consumption, and
C is the carbon intensity. By deﬁnition A = BC.
26To be more speciﬁc, A = ct
c1960, B = et
e1960, and C = ct
c1960/ et
e1960. Hence A = BC.
30The misspeciﬁcation problem can be rigorously described by using the
causal framework presented in chapter 2. The long-run model is the base of
policy implications, and counterfactuals are stated with the long-run model
equation (9). Therefore we can interpret the long-run model as a causal
model and use the framework to show inconsistencies in the way causal state-
ments are made.
We begin by ﬁrst noting the three mechanisms dictated by the CKC-
hypothesis and our knowledge of the deﬁnitions. These mechanisms describe
how the variables relate to each other and allow us to construct a structure
that can be compared to Ang’s structure.
First, we take into count the deﬁnition of carbon emissions in iden-
tity (11). To clarify the results, we omit emissions from gas ﬂaring and
cement manufacturing, and use equation (12). This states that carbon emis-
sions can be decomposed into carbon intensity at and energy use et.
Second, output yt is a cause of carbon intensity at according to the CKC-
hypothesis. This is also implied by Ang (2007) as shown in the previous
section. Because we want to assess the bias in relation to Ang’s model,
we assume that model equation (9) is satisﬁed.27 But because it actually
describes a mechanism for carbon intensity at (as shown in the previous
section), we use the equivalent equation (19). In other words, we assume
that equation (19) is satisﬁed to make a sensible comparison.28
Third, we note that also energy use et depends on output yt. This basic
notion, which is fairly evident (the details are the subject of the immense
energy-output-nexus literature), is actually the motivation behind the strand
of literature initiated by Ang (2007), and is essential to the CKC-hypothesis.
Nonetheless it is unintentionally neglected due to the model formulation. To
capture this relationship, we simply assume that there is a diﬀerentiable and
monotonically increasing function e for which et = e(yt) + vt, where vt is a
error term.29
27 Note that we do not argue that this model is empirically valid in all respects. To the
contrary, as we argue in Appendix E, carbon intensity is not a parabola. We construct
our model to isolate one only one faulty aspect of Ang’s model, i.e. the bias, and focus on
that.
28Note that also equation (9) could be chosen but this would result in an unfounded
causal ordering (presented in the previous section) without aﬀecting the bias.
29The existence of another cointegration equation can not be ruled out by the cointe-
gration tests. Tests, that are derived from Johansen (1988) and used in Ang (2007), reject
the null hypothesis of zero cointegration equations against the alternative of one or more
31In addition, we ﬁx yt because it represents our action variable, and we
ﬁx ut and vt as ceteris paribus assumptions. This is denoted by equations
yt = y0
t, ut = u0
t, and vt = v0
t.
These three mechanisms and three exogeneity equations form a set of
equations, a structure with additive interventions,
ct = at + et (24a)
at = β0 + (β1 − 1)et + β2yt + β3y
2
t + ut (24b)














The reasoning in the graph can also be expressed less formally. First,
suppose yt, ut, and vt are determined by an external process, the economy
for example. Now also et is determined by yt and vt through the mechanism
(24c). When et, yt, and ut are known, using equation (24b), also at is deter-
mined. Now et and at are set, so carbon emissions ct is known by deﬁnition
with equation (24a).
Note that we could, for example, form the structure with model equations
(9), (24a) and (24c)–(24f), but this would alter the causal ordering. As Si-
mon (1953) show, this would be empirically indistinguishable from structure
(24), even if it is theoretically invalid. In other words, the identiﬁcation of
the model is only partial. We choose the structure (24), from a set of em-
pirically equivalent structures, because the resulting causal ordering is more
reasonable. This, however, does not aﬀect our main concern, the bias.
cointegration equations. (See e.g. Lütkepohl, 2005, p. 329; Watson, 1994; Hamilton,
1994)
32To assess the bias, we need to calculate a causal eﬀect for the model
deﬁned above, and compare it with the causal eﬀect in Ang’s model. The
magnitude of the causal eﬀect of output yt on carbon emissions ct in structure
(24) can be calculated by applying the implicit function rule, as shown in
Appendix F. The (total) causal eﬀect is given by
dct
dyt
= (β2 + 2β3yt) + e
0β1. (25)
Now causal eﬀect (25) can be compared to the biased interpretation in
expression (17). We see clearly, that the model speciﬁcation of Ang (2007)
is biased by the term −e0β1, which is negative in the plausible case. First, e0
is positive when larger output implies more energy use. Second, the param-
eter β1 should also be positive, as energy use has positive eﬀect on carbon
emissions.
The negative bias has two implications for the shape of the CKC.
First, the tipping point of CKC is at a higher level of output when bias
exists. We show this in Appendix F. This means the tipping point will occur
later than estimated in Ang (2007). This is supported by Figure 1, where we
can see that Ang’s estimate for the tipping point, 9.31, is clearly on the left
side of the parabola.
A second implication for the shape is that the unbiased CKC grows
quicker and declines more slowly, than the biased one. This is simply due
to the fact that, for all levels of output yt the biased causal eﬀect is smaller
than the unbiased one. Before the tipping point of the biased CKC, car-
bon emissions are actually growing faster. After the biased CKC has tipped,
emissions are actually still growing for awhile. And after the true tipping
point, emissions are declining but slower then the biased CKC implies.
The unbiased shape draws a more pessimistic view regarding the conﬂict
between development and climate change policy goals.
5. Conclusions
We have deﬁned a framework for analyzing causality in econometric mod-
els, and proposed a solution to key controversies in the literature of causal
analysis. The framework allows to rigorously analyze causal implications in
complex models where analysis has previously not been tractable.
We have shown that a common practice of policy analysis with VECM
can result in biased or even infeasible estimates due to an unsuited testing
33procedure. If VECMs are to be used in policy evaluation, the testing pro-
cedure for the cointegration rank should avoid false positives and negatives
equally, and absolve possible logical contradictions. On the other hand, it
might be more fruitful to approach the issue from estimation theory instead
of testing.
Regarding the CKC literature, we have shown, ﬁrst, that using a trans-
formation of an endogenous variable as an endogenous variable in a VAR
model creates a constraint. Second, neglecting the dataset deﬁnitions alters
the interpretation of the model parameters signiﬁcantly. As a result, the new
CKC literature answers a very diﬀerent question compared to conventional
CKC-literature. The estimated relationship is not the CKC as a whole. For
the most part, it just estimates the relationship between carbon intensity
and output, which neglects the causal eﬀect through energy use. Third, en-
ergy use causes a misspeciﬁcation bias, when a change in output implies a
change in the level of energy use. As a result, the criticized model speciﬁca-
tion gives an overly optimistic view of the compatibility of development and
environmental policy goals. If there is a tipping point, it occurs later than
expected. Before tipping, output increases emissions faster, and afterwards,
emissions drop slower than anticipated. To answer any relevant questions
about the CKC-hypothesis, one can not simply combine the energy-output
and carbon-output nexuses into one equation.
Appendixes
Appendix A. Proofs
Lemma 1. Substructures of a structure are disjoint.
Proof. Assume that the proposition is not true. Now let A and B, A 6= B, be
proper substructures of a structure, such that they have common equations,
i.e E = A∩B is non-empty. Let S = A∪B. Denote by NA, NB, NE, and NS
the number of equations, and by na, nb, ne, and ns, the number of non-trivial
variables in sets A, B, E, and S, respectively.
As a rule of set theory, equations
NS = NA + NB − NE and (A.1)
ns = na + nb − ne (A.2)
must be satisﬁed.
34Substructures must contain as many equations as variables, i.e. NA = na
and NB = nb. The second regularity condition requires that ns ≥ NS. Now
plugging these into (A.1) gives inequality ns ≥ na + nb − NE. Plugging
this into equation (A.2) and rearranging gives ne ≤ NE. By the second
regularity condition, we must have ne ≥ NE. Now ne = NE. According
to the third regularity condition E must be solvable. Due the deﬁnition of
a substructure, B and C should not contain solvable subsets, so subset E
should not be solvable, i.e. we have a contradiction.
Lemma 2. The partition is unique.
Proof. Assume that there is an alternative partition. Now there must be
a substructure in the alternative partition that, ﬁrst, contains a equation
that is in a substructure of original partition, and, second, contains another
equation that is not in substructure of original partition. Therefore these
substructures are not disjoint, which contradicts Lemma 1.
Appendix B. Calculating the causal eﬀect
Consider a causal model with continuous variables and diﬀerentiable
model functions g with additive interventions that deﬁne deep model function






















be a structure of the corresponding causal model.



























and let Jh(i,j) denote a corresponding determinant where ith row has been




















































where the latter derivate is calculated from set of equations g(y,x) = 0. This
means, that in the additive interventions case causal eﬀects can be calculated
simply from the model equations.
Appendix C. Deﬁnition of carbon emissions
In this appendix we derive a identity from the deﬁnitions of the dataset.
This identity is the source the second problem presented in Section 4.
First, the dataset in use (WDI) deﬁnes carbon dioxide emissions as a
linear function of fossil fuel combustion and cement manufacturing. The
amount of carbon dioxide emissions caused by combustion is determined by
the chemical composition of the fuel. The emitted amount of carbon dioxide
is calculated by multiplying the amount of fuel usage by a constant factor
prescribed by the chemical properties of the fuel. Thus, the total carbon
dioxide emissions Ct is a linear combination of the usage of oil Eoil
t , solid fuels
Esolid
t , natural gas E
gas
t , and gas ﬂaring E
flare
t , in addition to emissions from










t + St, (C.1)
where αoil, αsolid, αgas, αflare > 0 are the related ratios of emissions to fuel
quantity. (See Boden et al., 2009)
Second, total energy use Et can be deﬁned as the sum of oil Eoil
t , solid
fuels Esolid
t , natural gas E
gas
t , and other energy sources Eother
t , such as nuclear
energy and renewable fuels, which do not cause emissions in the aforemen-










To clarify the notation we deﬁne two sets of variable: the set of energy
commodities aﬀecting carbon dioxide emissions, C = {oil,solid,gas,flare},
and the set of energy commodities that amount to total energy use, E =
{oil,solid,gas,other}.










t ≥ 0 for all i ∈ E and
P
i∈E qi
t = 1 for any t. By rearranging and
plugging this into identity (C.1) to eliminate Ei









By interpreting the sum term as the average emissions rate of energy con-
sumption, we can identify it as carbon intensity and denote it by At, so that
Ct ≡ EtAt + αflareE
flare
t + St. (C.2)
This is simply an accounting identity derived from the deﬁnitions of the
dataset, so it must be satisﬁed by the observed values.
To derive an algebraically more convenient form, we note that gas ﬂaring
and cement manufacturing amount only to a percent of total carbon emissions
in the data, thus they can be omitted, i.e. set to zero. Therefore taking a
natural logarithm of equation (C.2) gives
ct = et + at,
where the variables are the corresponding logarithms of the capital letter
variables.
37Appendix D. Short run models
Appendix D.1. Causal ordering of VECMs
Model B in Section 2.6 consists of equations (5)–(8) and forms a structure


































2 . . .
(D.1)
when the values yi
0 are given.
Model A replaces equation (8) with z2
0 = 0. The resulting graph equals
(D.1) when the dotted arrows are removed and variables z2
t are put in the
ﬁrst row. Model A lacks the causal relationships represented by the dotted
arrows in graph (D.1) and therefore has a diﬀerent causal eﬀects.
Appendix D.2. Problem 2 in the short-run model
Consider the VAR model equation (13) for time t = 0,1,...,T. To avoid
the problem described in Section 4.1 we omit the equation describing y2
t.
That is,
xt = a0 +
p X
i=1
Aixt−i + εt, t = 0,1,...,T,









i] is a matrix of parameters




t) is a vector of error terms.
38We supplement this with equation (12) for each t.
Our exogeneity equations are c0 = c0
0, e0 = e0
0, y0 = y0
0, and εt = ε0
t for
all t = 0,1,...,T.
Now we have 4(T + 1)) model equations and T + 4 exogeneity equations





















which shows the same problematic causal ordering as in the long-run model.
Appendix E. Explaining the ﬁt
In this appendix we consider Ang’s model’s relation to the data. In the
section 4.2 we have assumed that Ang’s model is correct (only the interpre-
tation is wrong) and disregarded the problem shown in Section 4.1. So how
can we account for the good ﬁt of the model? As we have shown, in Ang’s
model changes in carbon emissions result from changes in carbon intensity.
Therefore we look into this variable.
Carbon intensity at has decreased in France (Figure E.4) because of a de-
cline in the share of heavily polluting fuels like coal. They have been replaced
or outgrown by the use of oil, natural gas and nuclear energy (Kaufmann,
1992). Especially in the case of France, is seems that nuclear energy has had
a signiﬁcant impact (see Iwata et al., 2010).
This is in line with the traditional CKC-hypothesis: the decline in carbon
intensity is a result of economic growth, however this is contrasted by a
growth in energy use, resulting in an “inverted U”-shape between emissions
and output.
Because model equation (9) is equivalent with (19), we should see an
“inverted U”-shape also in carbon intensity. Figure E.4 does not suggest
39such a relationship for France in the period 1960-2006. But why then does
Ang get signiﬁcant estimates?















































Figure E.4: The logarithm of Carbon intensity of energy use, measured in kilograms of
carbon dioxide emissions per kilogram of oil equivalent energy, and the logarithm of per
capita GDP.
The delusive ﬁt of the parabola can be explained by inspecting the ﬁtted
model in Ang (2007). Ang reports the parameter estimates β0 = −161.38,
β1 = 2.25, β2 = 31.11, and β3 = −1.67. By using these in model (9),
rearranging, and taking the conditional expected value we get equation
ct − 2.25et + 161.38 = 31.11yt − 1.67y
2
t. (E.1)
The left hand side of equation (E.1) is the part that is alloted for output to
explain. Because β3 is negative, the value of the right hand side as a function
of yt is an upside-down parabola. Suppose this is truly so. Then, to satisfy
equation (E.1), also the left hand side should be a parabola.
40The values of the left side terms are plotted against yt in Figure E.5
along with the regression curve (dashed curve), i.e the right hand side of
equation (E.1).30 The misleading goodness of the ﬁt of the “inverted U”-
shaped curve found by Ang (2007) can be explained by observing, that most
of the observations lie on the right hand side of the parabola.









































































Figure E.5: The solid line is the relationship between the logarithm of per capita CO2
emissions unexplained by energy use and the logarithm of per capita GDP. The dashed
line is the corresponding regression curve, i.e. the right hand side of equation (E.1), and
the vertical line indicates the tipping point.
However, this does not give a reason to suspect the existence of a tipping
point in the carbon intensity or an "inverted U"-shape. As in Ang’s model,
30 The seemingly biased ﬁt in Figure E.5 might be due strong sensitivity to the rounding
of the parameter values. Alternative parameter that have the same rounded value can shift
the regression curve to give an opposite bias. On the other hand, this might be due to
problem described in Section 4.1.
41there exists a CKC if and only if the plot in Figure E.5 is polynomial, we can
not arrive to our result simply by assuming it. That is, if we can not justify
Figure E.5 (or Figure E.4) representing a polynomial shape (with a tipping
point in the sample), we can not justify the existence of a carbon Kuznets
curve.
Why the do we see a parabola shape in Figure 1? Here energy use is not
ﬁxed, thus the parabola is formed by the rising energy use and the declining
carbon intensity. But in Ang’s model the term 31.11yt−1.67y2
t plots a curve
for a ﬁxed energy level. Therefore this term cannot be plotted in Figure 1,
without letting energy use vary. This connection between output and energy
use is the source of the problem in Section 4.3.
Appendix F. Mathematical derivations for section 5.3.
The magnitude of the causal eﬀect of output yt on carbon emissions ct
in structure (24) with additive interventions can be assessed by applying the































where we denote e0 = ∂et
∂yt. By calculating the determinants, we get expression
−
(β2 + 2β3yt) − e0(−1 + (1 − β1))
−1
,
which can be simpliﬁed to determine the (total) causal eﬀect
dct
dyt
= (β2 + 2β3yt) + e
0β1. (F.1)
Now causal eﬀect (F.1) can be compared to the biased interpretation in
expression (17). We see that the model speciﬁcation of Ang (2007) is biased
by the term −e0β1, which is negative in the plausible case.
42Next we show that the tipping point of CKC is at a higher level of output
when bias exists. In the unbiased case the tipping point y∗
t is such that the















Now, when e0β1 > 0, adding β2 to both sides gives β2+e0β1 > β2. Because



















That is, the true tipping point occurs at a higher level of output.
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